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Elderly individuals are consistently reported as having difficulty in identifying the facial 
expression of negative emotions; they pay less attention to negative emotional stimuli, and 
experience less emotion themselves when compared to younger adults.  The ability to process 
emotion is thought to be critical for communication with others and yet, despite the claims 
above, healthy-aging older adults do not appear to demonstrate interpersonal problems in their 
everyday lives.  Therefore, although older adults are significantly worse at explicitly labelling 
emotions compared with younger adults, it may be that they are still able to implicitly identify 
the emotions and therefore adapt their behaviour accordingly.  This study aims to determine 
the healthy aging adults’ ability to explicitly and implicitly process the facial expression of 
emotion.  Analysis was undertaken to determine which specific emotion the older group had 
difficulty with when asked to identify the implicitly presented emotion, whether the position 
of the presentation of the photograph had any influence, the role of social contact on 
performance, and whether, in-keeping with previous research, the older group had significant 
difficulty correctly identifying the explicitly presented facial expressions of emotion when 
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Interest in this research project grew from awareness that elderly individuals were 
consistently reported as having difficulty in identifying the facial expression of negative 
emotions, they pay less attention to negative emotional stimuli, and experience less emotion 
themselves when compared to younger adults (Mather et al, 2004).  The ability to process 
emotion is thought to be critical for communication with others (Surcinelli et al, 2006) and 
yet, despite the claims above, healthy-aging older adults do not appear to demonstrate 
interpersonal problems in their everyday lives.  Therefore, although older adults are 
significantly worse at explicitly labelling emotions compared with younger adults, it may be 
that they are still able to implicitly identify the emotions and therefore adapt their behaviour 
accordingly.  In line with this hypothesis, studies have shown that older adults’ implicit 
processing is often not affected by age (Parkin, 2001).   
 
The aim of this study is therefore to assess the ability of the healthy aging adult in the 
processing of the explicit and implicit facial expression of emotion. 
 
1.1 Emotion and the importance of emotion 
 
It has long been argued that there is a biological basis to emotion (Ekman, 1992), and many 
agree with an evolutionary foundation as posited by Darwin (1965). 
 
A public argument ensued when Ortony and Turner (1990) questioned whether there were in 
fact basic emotions.  They claimed there was a lack of empirical or theoretical standing for the 
argument that all emotions were developed from the basic six emotions.  In a table they listed 
a number of authors with an interest in a basic-emotion theory.  Many of these emotions are 
not part of the postulated six, for example aversion, courage, desire, and pain.  The number of 
basic emotions suggested varies from two to eleven.  They then argue that this lack of 
consistency of the number of basic emotions hampers further development in the research of 
the expression of emotion.  Ekman (1992) then challenged their assumptions on the basis of 
their review of the literature being faulty, and making false claims.  In response Turner and 
Ortony (1992) stated that as critics of their stance each began at a different starting point in 
their own research, it would not be probable for there to be a convergence on views. 
 
 
In 1995, Rosenberg and Ekman claimed that for more than forty years there had been an 
overwhelming amount of evidence to support the assertion that there were universally 
recognised facial expressions of emotions.  These were anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness, and surprised.    Studies reviewed were those undertaken in both literate and pre-
literate cultures and some had cross-cultural evaluation.  Not all researchers agreed, but it is 
now generally accepted there are universal expressions of emotion.  These expressions of 
emotion include anger, contempt, sadness, happiness, surprise, disgust, and fear/anxiety 
(Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004).  There is no consistent agreement on whether contempt is 
actually accepted as one of the six basic emotions. Some authors use contempt in their 
studies, although this is not one of the original six basic expressions of emotion.  
Additionally, this expression is frequently confused with happiness, fear and disgust 
(Rosenberg and Ekman, 1995) and so will not be used in this study.   
 
The facial expression of emotion can involve quite a complex number of facial muscles 
which, when used in differing combinations, can signal different emotions (Ekman, Fiesen, 
and Ellsworth, 1972).  For example, the zygomatic muscle can act alone to indicate happiness 
by pulling up the lip corners, but when acting with other muscles it can signal sadness.  
Ortony and Turner (1990) argued each facial muscle had universal significance.  Ekman 
(1992) said not so.  However, he did note it only takes one muscle action to display the 
expression disgust, and one other to display the emotion of happiness.  Perhaps this helps in 
understanding why these two emotions are said to be easily recognised.  It may be that as the 
other facial expression of emotion requires the action of more than one muscle, this may lead 
to individual differences and so possibly lead to mislabelling by the observer.  Waller, Cray, 
and Burrows (2008) however, question the model of universality on the basis that in order for 
the facial expression of emotion to be universal, every individual would have to have the 
same facial musculature and symmetry, and, they argue, they do not.   
 
The length of time for which an emotion is displayed may vary.  The expression of emotion 
can have a quick or slower onset, and may be displayed for a very brief moment or 
maintained for some length of time (Ekman, 1992).  The onset and maintenance of the facial 
emotional display can signal the intensity of the emotion, but it is also important to note that 




Further support for a biological basis of emotion was provided by Ekman, Levenson and 
Friesen (1983) who identified emotion-specific autonomic nervous system activity.  These 
findings were later replicated in an older population (Levenson, Carstensen, Friesen and 
Ekman, 1991) and cross-culturally (Levenson, Ekman, Heider, and Friesen, 1992).  Ekman 
(1992) argues these findings show a particular pattern of activity restricted to those emotions 
such as anger, fear and disgust, which when stimulated, may require motor activity relevant to 
survival.  Other emotions, he contends, will have their own pattern of activity.   
 
Emotion is something most of us can claim to experience – either as a feeling within 
ourselves or as an observation within others.  Time and again the social role of emotion is 
emphasised, with Taylor, Edmonds, McCarthy and Allison (2001) stating faces and their 
expressions are the most important visual stimuli for individuals in their social interactions.  
Adolphs (2002) refers to the facial expression of emotion as emotional signals, and states they 
may be considered as aspects of both an emotional response and social communication. 
Moreover, whilst Lobaugh, Gibson, and Taylor (2006) stress the significance of the 
processing of the emotions in social interactions, Vassallo (2009) asserts it is the ability to 
interpret the facial expression of emotion that plays an important role in interpersonal 
interactions.   
 
Ekmann (1992) emphasises the importance of the facial expression of emotion throughout 
life.  They are involved in attachment in infancy and indeed in adult attachment (courtship).  
There is evidence to show that where individuals have no ability to make a facial expression 
of emotion, they have difficulty with establishing and maintaining relationships.  Evidence for 
those with difficulty with recognition of the facial expression of emotion is considered further 
in Section 1.3. 
 
Conversely, perhaps the recognition of the facial expression of emotion is not terribly 
complicated as acknowledged by Mill, Allik, Realo and Valk (2009) when they refer to the 
expression and recognition of emotion as being two basic skills in normal social interaction.  
However, whether innate, basic or complicated, the ability to recognise the facial expression 
of emotion is important in every day life as it will inform how an individual should react 
towards another and whether it is necessary to alter their own behaviour in response to the 
emotions of others. 
 
 
If the recognition of the facial expression of emotion is innate, biological and be important to 
survival in evolutionary terms, then we would expect to have evidence of the ability from an 
early age.  We shall now move on to consider this evidence. 
 
1.2 Emotion recognition through the ages 
 
Given that there is a strong argument for a biological, innate basis to the recognition of the 
facial expression of emotions, one would expect to see evidence for this in those as young as 
babies and infants.  Herba and Phillips (2004) demonstrated a child’s ability to evaluate and 
correctly interpret the facial expression of emotion follows a very slow developmental course, 
which continues through adolescence.  This actual development however, has been shown to 
be efficient in individuals as young as seven months old.  Peltola, Leppänen, Vogel-Farley, 
Hietanen and Nelson (2009) found in their study that seven-month-old infants show adult-like 
attentional biases toward fearful faces.  The infants scanned the eye area more than other 
regions of the face, in keeping with the findings of four- to fifteen-year-olds (Taylor, 
Edmonds, McCarthy and Allison, 2001) and in adults (Schyns, Petro, & Smith, 2007).  They 
tended to remain fixated on fearful faces, in comparison to happy and neutral faces.  This 
enhanced fixation of fearful faces was also shown in adults (Georgiou, Bleakley, Hayward, 
Russo, Dutton et al, 2005).  Although Yang, Zald, and Blake (2007) propose this would be as 
a result of simply detecting fearful eyes alone, Peltola et al (2009) found the infants in their 
study disengaged from neutral faces with fearful eyes quicker than fully fearful faces, thus 
perhaps emphasising the importance of information from more than the eye region. 
 
Lobaugh, Gibson, and Taylor (2006) undertook a functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) study in ten to twelve year old children, whereby they were presented with faces 
displaying the six basic emotions for 500 ms and they were then asked to determine the sex of 
the presented face.  The results showed children of this age activated similar areas of the brain 
as adults do in response to being shown the emotional expressions without explicit attention 
to the emotion.  These areas included the insula, anterior cingulate, basal ganglia and limbic 
structures, all identified as important in emotion expression processing (Adolphs, 2002a).  
They also suggest their results show that the implicit discrimination of facial expressions of 
disgust and fear are accomplished by age ten years.  The children are activating different 
neural networks for sad faces, as also evidenced in adults.  However, Batty and Taylor (2006) 
 
suggest a more staggered developmental path with the neural processing in the younger 
children differing to that of adolescents, and the adult pattern appearing in the adolescents. 
 
Once the ability to discriminate different facial expressions of emotion is established in 
adulthood, it is not maintained for life.  Many studies have demonstrated that older adults 
have increasing difficulty with correctly identifying negative emotions.  However, there 
appears to be no consensus as to the age at which this decline in the ability to identify 
negative emotions begins.   
 
In a cross-sectional study Mill, Allik, Realo and Valk (2009) considered emotion recognition 
in static photographs, or slides, and in speech, in 607 participants aged 18 to 84 years.  The 
emotions portrayed were anger, contempt, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise and 
the neutral expression.  Participants were simply asked to make a choice from a list, which 
emotion was being displayed in the slide.  The slides were each shown for 10 s.  The mean 
recognition rate of facial expressions was 70%.  The younger age group (aged 20 years or 
less) were better at recognising sadness and anger, and indeed there was a significant negative 
linear correlation with age.  The oldest age group (aged 61 years or older) performed at less 
than chance level with these emotions.  The ability to recognise all of the other emotions 
remained almost constant until age 61 years when there was a considerable drop in ability.  
Correctly labelling the neutral expression was almost constant over all the age groups.  All 
age groups were best at identifying happy expressions then surprise expressions.  Further 
examination of the data revealed that when broken down into two age groups (younger and 
older) both confused emotion categories in a similar way, but the older group made more 
errors.  The authors also concluded that personality traits as rated by the NEO-FFI were not 
significant mediators of age-related effects in emotion recognition. 
 
Mill et al’s study (2009) was notable for demonstrating that the ability to correctly recognise 
the expressions of sadness and anger was actually declining from, what they describe as, an 
unprecedentedly early age, the fourth decade. 
 
Kelly, Quinn, Slater, Lee, Gibson et al (2005) showed that babies as young as three-months 
old have a preference for their own race faces, but this discrimination is absent in newborns.  
They suggest the preference is learned and derived from exposure to own- versus other-race 
faces during early development.  Further support for this explanation is offered by Elfenbein 
 
and Ambady, 2003 who suggest the modulation by race or ethnicity may be determined by 
experience.  Phelps et al (2000) and Jugenberg and Bodenhausen (2003), also suggest there 
may be a bias effect to own-race versus other and this is evidenced by the underlying 
neurobiology of face processing (Hart et al, 2000; Phelps et al, 2000; Golby et al 2001; 
Lieberman et al, 2005).  As a consequence of this, some research batteries of the facial 
expression of emotion have pictures of models of races and ethnicities other than Caucasian 
individuals.   
 
Having shown some abilities are evident from birth, we shall now consider how this 
identification is made. 
 
1.3 Emotion identification 
 
In common with other areas in the field of neuropsychology, a great deal of evidence for the 
identification of the facial expression of emotion has arisen from studying those with brain 
lesions, disease or injury.  However, as Adolphs (2002b) states, as there are many methods of 
investigating the facial expression of emotion, there are many explanations.  There is 
therefore not one system or structure involved.   
 
Difficulties in recognising the facial expression of emotion has been described in many 
neurological and psychological diseases.  There is strong evidence that people with 
Huntington’s disease, or gene carriers for the disease, are selectively impaired in recognising 
the facial expression of disgust (Sprengelmeyer, Young, Calder, Karnat, Lange et al, 1996; 
Sprengelmeyer, Young, Sprengelmeyer, Calder, Rowland et al, 1997; Gray, Young, Barker, 
and Curtis, 1997), whilst the recognition of this particular emotion appears to be selectively 
spared in adults with relatively mild Alzheimer’s disease (Henry, Ruffman, McDonald, 
O’Leary, Phillips et al, 2008).  Those participants in Henry et al’s (2008) study with mild 
Alzheimer’s disease did perform at a poorer level on all other facial expressions of emotion 
when compared with both older and younger control groups.  An earlier study of participants 
with mixed dementia described poor recognition of the emotions of anger, sadness and fear 
(Rosen, Wilson, Schauer, Allison, Gorno-Tempini et al, 2006).   
 
There are inconsistent reports of deficits in recognising the facial expression of emotion in 
individuals with Parkinson’s disease.  Some authors have reported general deficits (Yip, Lee, 
 
Ho, Tsang, and Li, 2003) whilst others have failed to replicate this (Pell and Leonard, 2005).  
A recent study by Ibarretxe-Bilbao, Junque, Toloso, Marti, Valldeoriola, Bargallo, and Zarei 
(2009) using Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) showed that the impairment in the 
recognition of the facial expression of emotion in those with early Parkinson’s disease also 
have an accompanying bilateral degeneration in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and amygdala. 
 
Lawrence et al (2007) demonstrated how patients with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
(OCD) showed greater activation than controls in the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, but 
reduced activation in the thalamus, to facial expressions of disgust. 
 
Other conditions which show a difficulty with the identification of the facial expression of 
emotion include Major Depression, Bipolar Disorder, Autism, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder, Schizophrenia, and Fronto-temporal dementias. 
 
All available test stimuli appear to have some limitations.  Furthermore, they frequently show 
common similarity in errors with participants selecting the wrong identification.  Disgust is 
commonly misidentified as anger, and some confuse surprise for the positive emotion 
happiness whilst others mistake it for the negative expression, fear (Rosenberg and Ekman, 
1995).  The commonality among stimuli, where different models are used in each one, 
suggests that there is a human difficulty in assigning a consistent descriptive label to certain 
facial expressions of emotion.  The emotional state of the participant may have a role to play 
here.  Rosenberg and Ekman (1995) tired to induce an emotional state with short stories when 
assessing participants’ perception of the facial expression of emotion.  They found this 
particularly impacted on the emotions anger, sadness and surprise. 
 
Ricci-Bitti et al (1989) also showed extra-facial cues such as head and eye position may 
contribute to the identification of the facial expression of emotion.  These will inevitably vary 
among the stimuli batteries and may impact on the results obtained. 
 
It is acknowledged that culture and social learning may have an influence, for instance, in the 
degree of expression of emotion or indeed in the restriction of its expression, and in the 
personal or societal interpretation of the emotion particularly when cultural norms indicate 
whether it is acceptable or not to express (Ekman, 1992).  Society would not be able to 
function in a healthy way if everybody simply reacted automatically to their emotions, and so 
 
on occasion, regulating one’s own emotion is crucial.  The extent to which an individual can 
regulate their own emotion is determined partly by age, with older adults reporting they have 
developed improved control of their negative emotions as they aged (Gross, Carstensen, 
Pasupathi, Tsai, Götestam-Skorpen, and Hsu, 1997) there being continued advantages into 
middle age (Rothbart, Ahadi, and Evans, 2000).    Despite this, there is an abundance of 
evidence in support of six emotions and the universality of these emotions (Ekman, Friesen 
and Ellsworth, 1972; Fridlund, Ekman and Oster, 1987).  Ekman and Friesen (1971) further 
showed that even in a preliterate, stone-age culture, isolated and free from mass media, the 
tribespersons accurately matched facial expressions with stories depicting the relevant 
emotions.  As further evidence for the universality of emotion these tribespersons were 
videoed displaying emotions described in the stories previously to them.  These videos were 
subsequently assessed by Americans and the emotions were accurately identified.  In a review 
of the published research from the previous 30 years Ekman et al (1972) showed that there 
was a great convergence of evidence for six emotions, namely happiness, surprise, fear, 
sadness, anger and disgust combined with contempt.  It is now generally agreed that disgust 
and contempt are separate emotions (Ekman and Friesen, 1986; Ekman and Heider, 1988). 
 
The importance of socialisation is further emphasised in the study by Bijlstra, Holland, and 
Wigboldus (2010).  These authors aimed to demonstrate the influence of general evaluations 
and stereotype associations on emotion recognition, and specifically to show evidence for 
their argument that stereotype associations influence the ease of emotion recognition.  They 
used photographs of two local ethnic groups displaying a facial expression of emotion.  One 
of the groups was the indigenous group, and the other was an immigrant group which was the 
most negatively stereotyped at that time.  They anticipated negative emotions would be 
quicker to identify in the immigrant group, in-keeping with their negative stereotype image.  
Their results mean this team are the first to identify that racial or gender stereotype 
associations may influence the categorization of emotional expressions.  This study only used 
three emotions, namely happy, sad and angry and so there is no knowledge of the influence of 
stereotype on the recognition of the other basic emotions.  Additionally, the vast majority of 
participants were female (56 out of a total of 64 participants) and there may be an 
unaccounted for difference between the stereotypical views of women when compared with 
men which may have skewed the results.  Notwithstanding this, the results do show the 




Ekman (1977) proposed two appraisal mechanisms for emotion, one of which he described as 
automatic and the other extended.  He determined that as reaction to an emotion may occur 
very quickly the initial response must sometimes be automatic and without conscious 
awareness.  On other occasions the response is more deliberate, considered and with cognitive 
appraisal.  Tracy and Robins (2008) showed that overall, emotion expressions can be 
accurately recognised and discriminated from each other very quickly (i.e. within 600 ms) and 
under cognitive load.   
 
Vassallo, Cooper, and Douglas (2009) were the first to suggest the orienting of attention to 
the lower part of the face, especially the nose, appears to differentiate the sexes.  Analysis of 
the scan path revealed that while both groups spent more time and looked more frequently at 
the eye region, males spent significantly more time viewing the nose and mouth.  The 
duration and number of fixations made to the nose were significantly greater in males (p<0.5).   
 
Vassallo et al (2009) were also the first group to show there were reaction time differences 
between the sexes across a range of universal emotions, which strengthens the role of 
socialisation.  However, the data regarding the role of sex in the identification of the facial 
expression of emotion has not been consistently shown. 
 
Many studies have used a fixed-choice paradigm when researching the identification of the 
facial expression of emotion.  Russell (1994) criticised respondents lack of ability to use free 
choice of description arguing that we may see more than one emotion in the face displayed, or 
perhaps no label suits that displayed and a ‘best choice’ is made.  Izard (1971) had already 
tried to address this through undertaking a study using a free-response format.  The reported 
results were consistent with those from fixed-choice studies which would add support to the 
universality of the basic emotions.  However, it is important to note the there was no report 
regarding how the words given in the free-response by participants were categorised.  Perhaps 
those words given were the same adjectives used in other studies, but without knowing this to 
be so, it makes it rather difficult to evaluate.  Furthermore, Rosenberg & Ekman, (1995) 
postulate that there is actually no need to have a list of adjectives or labels for emotion 




Having considered the identification of emotion we shall now move forward to consider 
neuropsychological explanations for the identification of the facial expression of emotion. 
 
1.4 Neuropsychology as an explanation   
 
As noted above, much of the research into the facial expression of emotion is undertaken by 
neurological examination.  This is undertaken in many forms and has identified many 
different brain regions as having a role in the processing of the facial expression of emotion. 
  
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has been identified as a crucial structure in the recognition of 
facial expressions of emotions (Adolphs, 2002a).  PET studies have reported activation in 
orbital regions when recognising facial expressions of emotions, and bilateral or unilateral 
lesions in the OFC may impair emotional face expression identification.  However, lesions 
elsewhere in the frontal cortex (dorsal or lateral) do not appear to impair this function 
(Herberlein et al, 2008).  The amygdala is involved in the recognition of facial expression of 
emotions (Adolphs, 2002a; 2002b), and mainly in the recognition of fear (Calder et al 1996).  
Whilst the insula and basal ganglia are implicated in the recognition of disgust (Adolphs, 
2002a). 
 
Recent evidence points to neural specificity of disgust reactions in healthy individuals, 
particularly the ventroanterior and anterior insula (Calder et al, 2007; Mataix-Cols et al, 
2008).  Mataix-Cols et al. (2008) showed that exposure to disgust images also activated 
regions associated with emotion regulation, namely the dorsolateral and rostral prefrontal 
cortices. 
 
Damage to the human amygdala impairs recognition of fearful (and, to a lesser extent, angry) 
facial expressions (Adolphs et al, 1994; Calder et al, 1996; Broks et al, 1998) while leaving 
recognition of other basic emotions relatively unaffected.  These neuropsychological results 
are supported by recent demonstrations of a differential neural response in the human 
amygdala to facial expressions of fear using positron emission tomography (PET) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Morris et al 1996, 1998; Phillips et al 1997). 
 
Sprengelmeyer, Rausch, Eysel, and Przuntek (1998) showed with functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) that disgusted faces activated right putamen and left insula cortex; 
 
angry faces enhanced activation in posterior right gyrus cinguli and medial temporal gyrus of 
left hemisphere; fearful faces showed activation in right fusiform gyrus and left dorsolateral 
frontal cortex.  All three emotions also showed activation of inferior part of left frontal cortex.  
Results support hypotheses derived from neuropsychological findings that the recognition of 
disgust, fear, and anger is based on separate neural systems, and also that the output of these 
systems converges on frontal regions for further information processing. 
 
Some authors have argued that the pattern of age differences in the identification of emotion 
may be related to the pattern of age changes within the neural systems (eg Calder et al, 2003; 
Isaacowitz et al, 2007; Phillips et al 2002).  Tisserand et al, 2002 argue that brain volume 
losses occur earlier and more rapidly in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) than other frontal 
areas, with brain volume loss and metabolic decline in the anterior cingulate cortex.  These 
areas have been identified as being active in the recognition of anger, happiness and sadness 
(Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Phillips et al, 1998; Blair et al 1999). Grieve et al (2005) argue there 
are some linear reductions in the amygdala volume with age, but there is some sparing of the 
basal ganglia with age (Calder et al 2003; Williams et al, 2006).  The importance of the 
amygdala has been recognised for some time as important in the processing of fear (Adolphs 
et al 1994) and sadness (Blair et al 1999). 
 
Neurological studies (mainly fMRI studies and lesion studies) commonly show facial 
expressions of emotion are associated with activation of the medial prefrontal cortex. 
A study by MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, (2002) provided evidence for emotion 
decoding lying more on the ventromedial area, and working memory more on the lateral 
frontal regions.  In summary, there is further evidence for the negative emotions (particularly 
fear) being implicated in the amygdala; anger in the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal 
cortices; disgust in the basal ganglia and insula; sadness in the subgenual cingulated; and  
happiness in the ventral striatum and putamen of basal ganglia. 
 
There is accumulating evidence from fMRI studies to suggests limbic and paralimbic regions, 
including the amygdala, anterior cingulate, and interconnected orbitofrontal and medial 
prefrontal regions implicated in emotion processing, are also relatively preserved over age 




Perhaps some of the most well-known research into the identification of the facial expression 
of emotion is that by LaDoux (1994).  He postulates that emotions should be studied one at a 
time because that is how they evolved.  He also stresses that emotion systems developed 
before consciousness and it is only through evolution that we have become aware of our 
emotions.  His work concentrates on the emotion fear.  He argues that the brain evolved to 
allow for decisions about danger to be dealt with in the absence of emotion.  When a stimulus 
occurs, the individual will react in the way it does to danger.  There is no need for a conscious 
awareness, only a response.  He suggests that the initial, quick response to fear is in the 
amygdala via the thalamic pathway.  The sound is then relayed from the thalamus to the 
cortex where cognition and consciousness play their part.  An appraisal is then made 
regarding the fearful stimulus and a decision on how to respond is made.   
 
This theory is likely to have its routes in evolution.  An ability to detect and react to a threat 
would enhance survival, and so this ability would have been selected for, in evolution. 
 
This theory of the role of the amygdala in the emotion fear is supported by numerous 
neurological studies as noted earlier. 
 
Technology is advancing fast, and perhaps the more technology is able to explore the 
different brain regions involved in the processing of the facial expression of emotion, the 
more mystifying it will become.  That we are able to pinpoint with apparent reasonable 
accuracy which areas of the brain are activated when processing a particular emotion is 
exciting, but perhaps a two-edged sword.  It is unlikely that any one small brain region is 
acting alone, but the technology is not yet sophisticated enough to identify, and highlight, the 
links to other brain regions, such as that between the amygdala and thalamus. 
 
Whilst there are undoubtedly neuropsychological explanations for the identification of the 
facial expression of emotion, there must also be social neuropsychological explanations as 
emotion recognition is said to impact greatly on an individual’s social abilities.  We shall now 






1.5 Social neuropsychology bias (Positivity bias) as an explanation 
 
As noted above, research has consistently shown that older adults have difficulty, to varying 
degrees, in identifying negative emotions.   
 
Whilst neuropsychology may propose some explanation, the socioemotional selectivity theory 
offers a different explanation.  Carstensen (1992) proposes the age differences in the 
perception of the emotion displayed may depend upon the valance of the emotion. 
 
It has been noted that as a population ages they have a different approach to life.  They are 
shown to have fewer incidences of anxiety and depression, and frequently older people are 
shown in longitudinal studies to have less negative affect as they age (Weissman, Leaf, Bruce 
and Florio, 1988; Charles, Reynolds, and Gatz, 2001).  Converging support for changes in 
aging adults is offered by Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr and Nesselroade (2000).  They showed 
that aging adults experience fewer daily incidences of negative emotions until age 60 years by 
which time it levels off, whilst Mroczek and Kolarz had previously shown in 1998 that there 
are modest increases in positive emotion from middle age to early old age.  
 
In 1992 Carstensen proposed a socioemotional selectivity theory and she continues to develop 
this further.  Essentially, she advocates that, as an individual ages, they will experience life 
differently.  As they become more aware of, and focus upon time they will increasingly be 
motivated to derive emotional meaning from life and less motivated to expand their horizon.  
They increasingly attend to the emotionally meaningful goals in their lives and become more 
adept at regulating their own emotions.  This ability to regulate their emotions, and emotional 
responses, offers further support to Ekman’s (1992) theory of not always making an automatic 
appraisal of emotions.  If the older adults orientate towards positive emotions and disregard 
the negative emotions, some cognitive appraisal must have occurred in order to make the 
more extended appraisal result in positive emotionally meaningful goal-directed behaviour.  
Additionally, this may explain the research which demonstrates the older person’s inability to 
label the explicit presentation of emotions but behave appropriately. 
 
The socioemotional selectivity theory also emphasises the role of social contact in the 
processing of emotion.  Through a process of continuous self-regulation, Carstensen, Fung, 
and Charles (2003) propose that the aging adult will deliberately choose to concentrate on the 
 
pursuit of emotionally meaningful goals.  This, they suggest, will involve the aging adult in 
behaving in a way that will make them feel good, and satisfaction with this feeling reinforces 
the behaviour.  In essence, the subjective state is the reward for the behaviour and so is self-
perpetuating. 
 
Older adults have an ever-decreasing social circle, often through the death of their peers and 
family members, but also, when compared with young adults, they are less likely to seek out 
new companions to replace those lost.  Carstensen (1992) suggests they tend to increase the 
importance with which they hold their relationships with family and long-term friends, to the 
exclusion of an opportunity to increase their social circle.  Often, if goals compete with each 
other the older adult will concentrate on the more emotionally meaningful goals.  Therefore, 
where investing in a new friendship risks negative emotional consequences (even something 
such as anxiety), this will be disregarded as it would not be seen as a beneficial investment of 
their time (Carstensen et al, 2003) when there is a known positive emotional benefit to 
investing in those already close. 
 
This loss of friends and family also strengthens the feeling of time passing by quickly for the 
older adult. Lang and Carstensen (2002) demonstrated a linear trend for adults aged 20 to 90 
years in which the older adults foresee a more limited future, irrespective of health status.  
Whilst younger adults foresee time as almost limitless and set their goals in accordance with 
this, the older adult foresees their future as limited with fewer opportunities open to them.  
This, Carstensen et al (2003) hypothesise, can be demonstrated by a curvilinear path whereby 
the trajectory can be highest in infancy and early childhood when emotional trust is 
established, and rises again in older adults when the future is perceived as limited.  The future 
no longer becomes an important consideration to the aging adult, but the present does. Time is 
perceived as running out.  These motivational shifts affect cognitive processing (Isaacowitz, 
Charles, & Carstensen, 2000). 
 
In addition to the social pruning for positive effects, the socioemotional selectivity theory also 
supports that older adults when compared with younger adults, disproportionately remember 
positive information, including autobiographical memories. 
 
The socioeconomic theory proposes that younger adults pay less attention to the emotional 
valence because (if healthy) they do not see time being a restraint to achieving goals.  
 
Carstensen et al (2003) consider that their needs for knowledge-related goals take prime 
consideration and they even go so far as to state that they pursue these knowledge-related 
goals relentlessly at the cost of emotional satisfaction. 
 
Support for the pursuit of positivity may be evident in research which has shown that older 
adults tend to reappraise negative expressions in a more positive light.  They also tend to 
focus on mouths which are less threatening but less informative for negative expressions, 
whilst younger adults spend more time looking at the more informative eye regions of 
negative expressions (Sullivan et al, 2007; Wong et al, 2005).   
 
The age-associated changes in social network composition, and the emotional experience 
derived from social interactions, suggest that older adults structure their social worlds to 
optimise emotionally meaningful, and therefore gratifying, experiences and to avoid 
potentially negative interchanges.  Age-related reductions in social contact have been widely 
documented in both longitudinal (Lee & Markides, 1990; Palmore, 1981) and cross-sectional 
studies (Cumming & Henry, 1961; Lawson, Moss & Fulcomer, 1987).  Older people interact 
less with others and appear to resist efforts by others to make new friends (Carstensen, 1986). 
 
In summary, the socioemotional selectivity theory is the assessment of time left in life that 
drives a shift in emotion-related goals.  As endings approach and concerns about the future 
decrease, knowledge-related goals lose importance.  In contrast, an increased present 
orientation emphasises goals related to emotional satisfaction and meaning.  This age-related 
motivational shift leads to alterations in the dynamic interplay between individuals and their 
environments such that optimisation of emotional experience is prioritised in later life. 
 
Some consideration also needs to be given to the possibility of general cognitive difficulty in 
the aging individual, and will be briefly covered in the next chapter. 
 
 
1.6 General cognitive difficulty as an explanation 
 
When taking into account the general cognitive difficulty as an explanation, one would 
consider the general cognitive decline seen in the aging adult.  It could be postulated that an 
age effect would be seen and would be greatest on the emotions that are most difficult to 
identify.  However, Calder et al 2003 argue that difficulty effects do not represent a viable 
 
interpretation because they found no age effect on disgust, which is a relatively difficult 
emotion to identify.  In addition to this, one would have to consider the relationship between 
IQ and the dorsolateral corex, and emotion and the ventromedial cortex.  It is not proposed to 
consider this theory for this study as all adults in the older group will undertake an 
examination to exclude cognitive decline. 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether the implicit processing of emotions is spared in 
older adults compared to explicit processing.   
 
It is hoped that this study will demonstrate that older adults are implicitly aware of both 
negative and positive facial expressions of emotion.  It is expected that, in-keeping with other 
research, the older adults will not perform as well as the younger adults in labelling the 
explicit facial expression of emotion. It is also expected that social contact will act as a 
modifying factor in the correct identification of the facial expression of emotion in the explicit 
identification task. 
 
This research is important because much of the work establishing difficulties with emotion 
labelling is undertaken with those with psychiatric and neurological disorders and they may 
also have impaired cognitive functioning.  Research with a healthy-aging older population 
will be informative. 
 
The ability to appraise the facial expressions of emotion is a key component of social 
cognition.  If those in the older group are able to implicitly label emotions, further studies 
could help to gain an understanding of what interferes with this post-labelling. 
 
The results will also be considered for developing further research on the older adults’ ability 














2.1 Ethical approval and consent 
 
Ethical approval for this study was sought from, and granted by, the University of 
Edinburgh’s Philosophy, Psychology & Language Sciences Research Ethics Committee.  




This study was a repeated-measures design in which the independent variable for both tasks 
was age of participant (with two levels: younger (18-40 years) and older (60-80 years)).  The 
dependent variables for the implicit task were the number of errors made (out of a maximum 
of 150) and the reaction time, and only the number of errors made (out of a maximum of 60) 




Individuals aged 18 to 40 years and 60 to 80 years were invited to participate from the 
University of Edinburgh Student Participant Pool, and the University of Edinburgh 
Psychological Research Participant Pool respectively.  Those recruited from the Student 
Participant Pool received course credits.  Those recruited from the Psychological Research 
Participant Pool received a small monetary remuneration for any expenses they may have 
incurred.  All were invited to participate in a study considering the effect of age on the 
processing of faces, and were not told at this point that it was a study specifically relating to 
the processing of the facial expression of emotion.  They were however, made aware of this at 
the end of the study and an opportunity was given to each to discuss any concerns they may 
have had by not being fully informed from the outset.  No-one expressed any concern 
regarding this. 
 
Following a successful pilot study, 51 participants were recruited to the study over a two 
week period.  Participants aged 18 to 40 years were allocated to the “younger” group, and 
those aged 60 to 80 years were allocated to the “older” group.  All participants in the younger 
group were recruited from the Student Participant Pool following an on-line advert for the 
research study.  Recruitment was sequential.  Technical difficulties with the randomisation of 
sequencing for the implicit task resulted in 11 participants’ data being excluded from the 
 
analyses, and three participants’ data was excluded because although educated in the English 
language, English was not the first language.  This resulted in 18 participants’ data within the 
younger group being used for all analyses.  All participants from the older group were 
recruited in sequential order from responses to an e-mail inviting participation.  19 
participants were initially recruited to the older group.  One participant had difficulty with the 
Benton Facial Recognition Test, scored below the “normal” score range, and is therefore not 
included in the study.  Therefore, data for a total of 36 participants is included in the analyses. 
 
All participants had normal or corrected to normal, vision and stated that nothing contained 
within the exclusion criteria applied to them. 
 
The mean age for those participants in the younger group was 19 years (range 18-20 years), 
and the mean age for those allocated to the older group was 67 years (range 61-75 years). 
 
All participants were Caucasian.  Overall, 64% of participants were female and 36% male.  
Overall, 86% of participants were right handed and 14% were left handed.  Further 





2.4.1 Benton Facial Recognition Test 
 
All participants were asked to undertake the short form of the Benton Facial Recognition Test 
(BFRT), as an assessment of face recognition abilities.  This test has extensive normative data 
(Benton, Sivan, Hamsher, Varney, and Spreen, 1994).  All photographs in the BFRT are black 
and white, male or female models, each with some hair but no clothing visible.  There are two 
forms of the BFRT.  The short form version, with 13 items, has a possible maximum score of 
27 points, whereas the long form version, with a further nine items, has a maximum possible 
score of 54 points.  For the first six items, Participants were presented with a target face above 
six test faces.  They were asked to indicate which of the six test faces identically matched the 
target face (all test faces are numbered).  For the remaining seven items, Participants are 
asked to identify which three of the six test faces matched the target face.  The test faces are 
taken from differing angles and with differing lighting to those of the target face.  No time 
limit is applied to undertaking the test, and it does not rely upon memory.  Using the Table on 
the record form, the short-form score was converted to a long-form score.  Those in the older 
 
group were eligible for additional points depending upon their age and years of education.  
The Corrected Long Form Score is reported, from a possible maximum score of 54.  A score 
of 41 or more is considered “normal”. Results are noted in Table 1. 
 
2.4.2 Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
 
All participants undertook the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) subset 
consisting of the Vocabulary and Martix Reasoning tasks.  Tasks were administered in that 
order as recommended in the WASI manual.  The test resulted in a measure of the Full Scale 
IQ-2 (FSIQ-2).  The WASI is a short and reliable measure of intelligence in the research 
setting, and is standardised, normed, and validated for those aged 6 to 89 years.  The 
Vocabulary subtest consists of a 42-item task.  The first four presentations are pictorial and 
the Participant was asked to name each of the pictures.  The other 38 are orally spoken and 
visually presented words and Participants were asked to orally define them.  This test is a 
measure of crystallised intelligence.  The Matrix Reasoning subtest has a series of 35 
incomplete gridded patterns with a choice of five possible pattern answers.  The Participant 
was asked to state which of the five they think the answer is.  This subtest is a good measure 
of nonverbal fluid reasoning.  The two described subtests estimate general cognitive 
functioning (The Psychological Corporation, 1999).  The subtest raw data scores were 
converted to age corrected T scores and the final FS2-IQ score is reported. Results presented 
in Table 1. 
 
2.4.3 Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination (ACE - R) 
 
All participants age 60 years or older were asked to complete the ACE-R Final Revised 
Version A (2005).  This battery of tests examines memory, verbal fluency, language, 
visuospatial abilities, attention and orientation.  The test is a dementia screening tool with a 
possible score range of 0 to 100.  It is sensitive to isolated frontal deficits (Lezak, 2004).  
Normative values suggest a cut-off of less than 88 gives 94% sensitivity and 89% specificity 
for dementia, and a cut-off score of less than 82 gives 84% sensitivity and 100% specificity 
for dementia. Results are presented in Table 1. 
 
2.4.4 Social Contact  
 
Using a survey developed by the researcher all participants were asked about the type and 
frequency of social contact they had, on average, with various individuals.  These individuals 
included (where appropriate) grandparents, parents, partner, siblings, children, grandchildren, 
 
close friends and distant friends.  Where applicable, they were then asked to indicate whether, 
overall, they thought this amount of contact was ‘not enough contact’, ‘too much contact’ or 




The experimental tasks were created and presented using E-Prime® 2 (Schneider, Eschman 
and Zuccolotto, 2007). 
 
Visual Stimuli – NimStim©  
 
Permission was sought and granted to use photographs from the NimStim battery as stimuli in 
this study.  This battery was chosen, not only on the basis of its validity and reliability, but 
because it had never been used before with the research Participant Groups in the University 
of Edinburgh Department of Psychology.  Other batteries have been used frequently and there 
was therefore a possibility that had any participant taken part in similar research, the results 
may be affected by familiarity of the stimuli.  Hopefully is using this new battery, this will 
have been avoided.. 
 
All photographs in the NimStim battery are in colour, naturally posed, of the head only, 
frontal pose, with clear background and no visible clothing. 
 
The original set consists of 43 professional actors and actresses displaying 672 faces.  There is 
a wide ethnic diversity, and in addition to the basic six emotions, a neutral expression and 
calm expression are included.  76% of the emotions were rated with an average reliability 
score ranging between 0.80 and 1.00 (Tottenham, Tanaka, Leon, McCarry, Nurse, Hare, et al, 
2009). 
 
For this study, five male and five female Caucasian individuals were chosen which reflected 
the participants own race or ethnicity.  Each of the ten individuals displayed each one of six 
emotions – happy, sad, angry, frightened, disgusted and surprised.  Therefore a total of 60 






2.4.6 Implicit Task 
 
The first task, the implicit task, consisted of two phases - a practice phase and a test phase, 
with a forced choice response.  The test phase was further broken down into two blocks to 
minimise fatigue, particularly with consideration for the older group.  The practice phase 
consisted of the presentation of six target photographs presented in a randomised order.  Each 
emotion was presented.  The test phase consisted of two similar blocks.  In each block, 75 
faces were presented as the prime face, in a randomised order.  Each face demonstrated one of 
the six emotions.  Each block consisted of all 10 stimuli individuals.  After the presentation of 
the first block, the screen displayed a message asking the participant to take a break and to 
then press the space bar when ready to resume the task. 
 
A fixation point (+) was displayed in the centre of the screen followed by a prime face.  This 
would be presented for 30 milliseconds, and then replaced by the fixation point.  Two 
photographs of the same individual presented as the prime would then be displayed, side by 
side on the screen.  One of the photographs was that used as the prime, the other was the same 
individual but displaying a different emotion.  Participants were asked to indicate which of 
the two photographs now presented, matched that shown quickly.  They made their choice by 
means of striking a key on the left of the keyboard coloured blue if they thought it matched 
the photograph displayed on the left of the screen, and by striking a key on the right of the 
keyboard coloured red if they thought the prime photograph matched that now presented on 
the right of the screen.  Participants were informed accuracy and reaction times were being 
measured.   Once a choice had been made, the two photographs were replaced by a fixation 
point and a further prime photograph was then presented. 
 
Participants did not receive any feedback on their performance. 
 
2.4.7 Explicit Task 
 
The second task, the explicit task, consisted of two phases – a practice phase and a test phase.   
 
Stimuli in the practice phase consisted of six consecutive, but randomly presented, 
photographs of one individual.  Each photograph displayed one of each of the six facial 
expressions of emotion.  Below each face were six adjectives namely, happy, sad, angry, 
 
frightened, disgusted and surprised.  The six adjectives were always presented in the same 
order, in the same position on the screen. 
 
The test phase consisted of one cycle of a randomised presentation of all 60 photographs each 
with the six adjectives as described above, displayed below the face. 
 
Participants were instructed that their task was to decide which adjective best described the 
emotion displayed by the individual on-screen.  They indicated their choice by pressing the 
appropriate letter on a keyboard, as specified on a large instruction sheet always displayed 
above the keyboard, and below the computer screen, and on-screen.  Participants were 
informed accuracy was being measured.  The photograph would remain on-screen until the 
Participant had made a choice.  Participants did not receive any feedback on their 
performance. 
 
Both the implicit and explicit tasks were first trialled on a number of younger and older adults 




























Limitations of This Study and Considerations 
 
There are some limitations to this study, the first being, although age effects were noted, there 
was a small number of participants recruited to each group. 
 
Ecological validity cannot be assured as static photographs were used, and perhaps different 
results would have been obtained if the presentation was more dynamic, perhaps including 
body movement and verbal tone. 
 
Whilst younger adults did not perform at ceiling and older adults performed at better-than-
chance, lessening the exposure time may make the implicit task more difficult and it may be 
possible to get a truer implicit response.  However, based on the experience of the participants 
in this study, it could be anticipated that any gains would be offset by an increase in the older 
adult anxiety. 
 
Some older adults displayed anxiety when undertaking the implicit task, but all said they had 
enjoyed the task, found it very interesting and would consider undertaking it again.  It was not 
possible to take account of any possible effect on performance this increased anxiety may 
have had. 
 
It was noted that some older adults appeared to show a lack of concentration.  Indeed, many 
talked through the test phase and some actually admitted to loosing concentration.  Perhaps 
the test phase was too long for them.  However, reducing this may affect results. 
 
Finally, older adults seemed to be less confident in their keyboard skills, and perhaps they 










Possible Future Developments 
 
When considering possible future developments, in the implicit task one should perhaps 
contemplate simply showing one photograph after the target face and asking if it is “the same 
or different”. 
 
Additionally, as a control implicit task, perhaps photographs of scenery could be used.  
Ruffman, Sullivan, & Edge (2006) showed younger and older adults did not differentiate in 
their response to non-face stimuli such as photographs of sporting activities or occupations. 
 
Finally, after excluding speech difficulties, it would be interesting to consider a means of 
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